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1.  Introduction 
 
Much of public economics does not consider the details of the administration of benefit 
programmes. The focus is on conditions for qualification, levels of payment, and 
lengths of entitlement. But how a programme is delivered in practice may be critical for 
its impact on individuals’ behaviour. In the case of unemployment benefits, programme 
administration has been argued to be of crucial importance in determining the extent to 
which generous benefit systems actually influence unemployment in OECD countries 
(Nickell et al. 2005). However, the empirical evidence on the impact of benefit 
administration on getting people back to work is still limited. We add to knowledge by 
evaluating experimentally a simple change in administration of unemployment 
insurance (UI) that has the potential for a substantial impact on unemployment duration. 
Our field experiment uses a randomised control trial.
1
 
The experiment was conducted in Hungary in 2003. The absence of open 
unemployment in planned economies meant that income support for people searching 
for work in Central and Eastern Europe did not exist prior to the 1990s. The debate 
about the behavioural impact of the new benefit systems has been considerable but, as 
elsewhere, has focused on levels and lengths of entitlements.
2
 As economies contracted 
in the early 1990s, the administration of benefits concentrated on delivery of payments. 
The subsequent recovery, and hence greater availability of jobs, prompts more 
consideration of benefit administration and the monitoring of job search activity. 
Section 2 provides background to our experiment and describes its design. 
Monitoring of claims prior to the experiment was light – and lower than in the 1990s. 
Treatment in the experiment increased the monitoring of claims – claimants made more 
frequent visits to the employment office and faced questioning about their search 
behaviour. Randomisation was achieved by assigning claimants to treatment or control 
on the basis of date of birth. Section 3 reports results which show marked differences 
                                                 
1
 Evidence from randomised control trials of unemployment benefit administration has grown in the USA, 
but is still thin on the ground in Europe. Recent US evidence includes Ashenfelter et al. (2005), Black et 
al. (2003) and Klepinger et al (2002). Earlier research is surveyed by Meyer (1995) and Fredriksson and 
Holmlund (2006). The small European literature includes the early work by Royston (1983, 1984) and 
Dolton and O’Neill (1996) for the UK (see also quasi-experimental evidence in McVicar 2008), Gorter 
and Kalb (1996) and van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) for the Netherlands, and Graversen and 
van Ours (2008) for Denmark. 
2
 See Boeri and Terrell (2002) for a summary. Examples include Ham et al (1998) for the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, Micklewright and Nagy (1999) for Hungary, and van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) for 
Slovenia. 
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between the sexes in the effect of treatment on benefit duration and outflows to 
employment. Treatment has quite a large effect on women aged 30 and over, while we 
typically find no effect for younger women or for men. Section 4 interprets this finding 
and Section 5 draws conclusions. 
 
2.  UI administration and the experimental design 
 
2.1 Background to the experiment 
 
Administration of unemployment benefit typically attempts to restrict benefit to people 
who are unemployed on the standard ILO definition (OECD 2000: 130): out of work, 
able to enter work at short notice, and undertaking active steps to find work. Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) data for Hungary show over two-thirds of UI claimants classified as 
unemployed on these criteria in 1993 (a low to average figure for Central Europe at that 
time – Bardasi et al. 2001), but only a half in 2002. Throughout the period, women with 
benefit were less likely to be ILO unemployed than men.
3
 
 Various methods of monitoring can be used to restrict benefit to the ILO 
unemployed. One is to require claimants to report periodically for face-to-face 
interviews in which information is sought on job search activity and is provided on 
possible opportunities. LFS data show the proportion of UI claimants in Hungary who 
had visited a public employment office in the previous month. The offices are 
responsible for both administration of benefits and matching claimants to suitable 
registered vacancies. The relevant question was first asked in the LFS in 1999, when 72 
percent of UI claimants had visited an office in the month prior to interview. But 
throughout 2000-3 the figure was below 60 percent. The fall coincided with new 
legislation requiring claimants to make visits at least once every three months. Existing 
law had required visits to be ‘regular’, with the frequency left to offices’ discretion. Far 
from tightening administration, the new law seems to have led many offices that had 
                                                 
3
 See Micklewright and Nagy (2008, Table 1), where we also give the (lower) search figures for recipients 
of means-tested Social Benefit, which is available following UI exhaustion. Roughly equal percentages of 
the unemployed receive the two benefits. We also note that the percentage of the ILO unemployed 
receiving neither benefit rose substantially over 1993-2003. 
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required more frequent visits to take the three month period as standard (a conclusion 
borne out by our discussions with employment office staff).
4
  
 The frequency at which claimants had to return to employment offices prior to 
our experiment differed across the country.
5
 The Hungarian public employment service 
is organised into 20 counties. Each county has considerable discretion to interpret 
legislation as it sees fit. Practice also varies from office to office within counties. We 
collected information on office practices in Autumn 2002 from 28 offices (out of a 
national total of 170) spread over the six counties in which the experiment was to be 
conducted. In 16 offices, claimants were required to return every three months. In six 
offices the frequency was once a month and in the remaining six somewhere in 
between. (In all offices claimants could be contacted at any time and asked to attend in 
person to receive information on a vacancy that the office deemed suitable.) This 
variation is reflected in county-level differences in the percentage of claimants who had 
visited an employment office in the last month, recorded in LFS data. The 2003 figures 
for all 20 counties ranged from about 40 percent to over 70 percent. 
At the time of the 2003 experiment, no reporting by UI claimants of job search 
activity was required in Hungary. Claimants had only to register with their local 
employment office and then return regularly to continue to declare their availability for 
work. They needed to keep no records of employers contacted or of other efforts to find 
a job. No checks were made of search activity during visits to the employment office. 
 Monitoring will be more effective if there is a credible threat of sanctions 
following failure to comply. Sanctions for on-going UI claims in OECD countries 
typically involve suspension of payments for a fixed period or outright disqualification. 
In Hungary, missing an interview with the employment office is the classic explanation 
for the former while the latter is typically triggered by unreasonable refusal of a job 
offer generated through the local employment office or by behaviour that resulted in no 
offer being made (e.g. arriving drunk at a job interview).
6
 
 Figure 1 shows sanction rates in 2002 for the six counties in the experiment. The 
data refer to all suspensions and disqualifications of on-going claims, and rates are 
expressed as the annualised number as a percent of the average UI stock. We compare 
                                                 
4
 Hungary has little monitoring other than face-to-face interviews, e.g. claimants’ postal or phone reports 
of job search activity, as used in many states in the USA (Andersen 2001). 
5
 Substantial within-country variation in monitoring is found in many other countries (OECD 2000). 
6
 Suspension of benefit is usually until the claimant finally comes to the office. For second and 
subsequent offenses, the period of suspension uses up the claimant’s entitlement period. 
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the figures with rates defined on the same basis for other OECD countries. These vary 
greatly and, once more, there is also substantial regional variation within Hungary. The 
county of Vas sanctioned claims at the same broad level as Australia and the Czech 
Republic, which are among the tougher OECD countries in the graph, although nowhere 
near as tough as Switzerland or the US.  Szolnok is at a similar level to the UK, Norway 
and Finland, while Csongrad and Komaron at the other end of the range are more akin 
to Belgium and Denmark. Higher rates may reflect more frequent behaviour in need of 
sanction rather than a stricter application of the rules. We think the latter to be the case 
in Hungary. This leads us to expect that the impact of treatment in the experiment may 
vary geographically due to differences in the culture of sanctioning.
7
 
 The prima facie evidence therefore suggests that administration of UI in 
Hungary in 2003 had been weak since the early 1990s and weakened further in 2000. 
 
2.2  Design of the experiment 
 
The experiment began in late April 2003, covering new claimants registering in a three 
month period in six selected counties.
8
 Claims were monitored for up to four months. 
The six counties contained 48 employment offices (28 of which were included in the 
investigation of office practices described earlier). Counties were chosen partly to give a 
mix of labour market conditions and existing rigour in UI administration and partly 
because they had employment service managers who we believed would oversee the 
experiment appropriately.
9
 
Claimants were included in the experiment if they were aged below 50 and with 
75-179 days of UI entitlement. Older claimants were excluded due to their greater 
proximity to retirement age (55 for women and 60 for men at the time). The restriction 
to those with at least 75 days of entitlement was to avoid UI claims that would be short 
by definition. The restriction to less than 180 days of entitlement was to avoid persons 
eligible for an extended UI scheme introduced in 2003 just as the experiment was due to 
begin. All aspects of that scheme’s workings were unknown at the time and we judged it 
sensible to exclude claims eligible for extension. The drawback of these restrictions is 
                                                 
7
 Note that there is variation within counties by employment office; about half the variation in sanction 
rates across employment offices is at this level rather than between counties. 
8
 The experiment was planned with the National Labour Centre and then adopted as a Centre initiative. 
9
 Considerations of this type also influenced selection of employment offices in the Dutch experiment 
analysed by van den Berg and van der Klaauw, which was restricted to two offices with ‘a good 
reputation for carrying out counselling and monitoring activities in a highly orderly fashion’ (2006: 909). 
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that the experiment applied to a group with a specific employment history: claimants 
between 1 and 2½ years of insured employment in the four years prior to claim. They 
had either had periods out of work, e.g. due to previous unemployment, or had joined 
the labour force during this time. About two-thirds of those aged 30 and over in the 
sample had had a previous spell of UI during the four years and somewhat less than half 
of those under 30. Claimants satisfying the sample restrictions were divided into 
treatment and control groups at the outset of their claims on the basis of their birthdays 
– odd days of the month to treatment, even days to control. This amounts to random 
assignment. (We observed date of birth and could monitor assignment.) 
Claimant behaviour suggested by LFS data and the existing state of UI 
administration had implications for the experiment’s design. First, the main instrument 
of monitoring was the requirement to report regularly to the local employment office. 
Policy was inadvertently relaxed in 2000 and an obvious choice was to explore its 
tightening. Second, offices rarely asked about job search activity, so questioning 
claimants on this was again a natural measure to trial. Third, women appeared less 
likely to search and be available for work than men, and hence we included both sexes 
in the experiment. Fourth, the heterogeneity across the country in UI administration 
implied a choice between comparing the effect of treatment against a varied status quo 
and comparing against a homogenised control ‘regime’. We chose the latter, in the hope 
of obtaining cleaner estimates of the treatment effect. 
To add to this background, we had to recognise that office clerks, overseen by 
office and county managers, would be administering the treatment. A culture of light 
monitoring affected what could be tried without risking a significant problem of 
implementation: the experiment had to be ‘do-able’, allowing office clerks to carry it 
out conscientiously. Our experiment also had to be legal, with treatment and sanctions 
permitted by existing law. 
Spells of UI were administered as follows for the duration of the experiment: 
 
Control: Visit the employment office every three months and face no 
questions on job search. 
 
Treatment:  Visit the employment office every three weeks with office clerks 
asking questions on job search behaviour since the last visit. 
 
9 
 
Questions on job search began to be asked of the treatment group at their first scheduled 
return to the office three weeks after initial UI registration. These questions concerned 
search methods used since the last visit (seven methods were asked about), contacts 
with employers (other than vacancies suggested by the office), names and addresses of 
up to three employers contacted (and the specific person contacted), reasons for lack of 
employer contact if none had taken place, and hours each week spent looking for work. 
Answers were recorded by the clerks on paper forms. Since each claim was monitored 
for up to four months, claimants in the treatment group made a maximum of four 
requested visits at three-weekly intervals to the employment office (after the initial visit 
for UI registration). At the end of the experiment, in principle each participating office 
reverted to its previous practice of administering claims (visits at a frequency of 
between one and three months and no questions on job search asked at these visits – 
although see below on the latter). 
Sanctions for failure to come to an interview during the experiment remained as 
before (including any local variation), but claimants in the treatment group were by 
definition exposed to the threat of this sanction more frequently. Additional sanctions 
could not be applied to those reporting no search (this would have required legislative 
change), but claimants would not have known this; they would have been uncertain as 
to the implications of failure or repeated failure to search. (Even claimants who had 
been recently unemployed would not have perfect knowledge of current regulations and 
office practices.)
10
 
Claimants were unaware of the experiment and issues of recruitment and drop-
out do not arise. In principle, individuals in the two groups could have talked to each 
other and discovered that their claims were being administered in different ways. But 
we think this very unlikely in practice. Most claims were dealt with by employment 
offices in reasonable sized settlements where few claimants would know each other. All 
offices were changing their practices for a large group of claimants not covered by the 
experiment – the UI extension scheme referred to earlier – so variation in treatment 
within the same office would not have been cause for surprise.
11
 
In general the experiment operated well. One of us (Nagy) joined National 
Labour Centre staff in training sessions for office staff and together with an assistant 
                                                 
10
 Note that a sanctioned UI claimant could not receive means-tested Social Benefit as an alternative. 
11
 We do not think there was ‘contamination’ between treatment and control groups (we monitored 
assignment based on birth date). However, if control claimants talked with those getting treatment and as 
a result felt pressure to search, our estimates should provide a lower bound on the impact of treatment. 
10 
 
visited many of the offices with county managers during the experiment’s conduct. 
Most offices were very co-operative and some decided to continue with the questioning 
on search after the experiment ended. The forms recording the reported search activity 
of claimants in the treatment group were collected from the offices fortnightly. 
However, occasional reluctance from clerks was encountered and in one county we had 
reservations about the conduct of the experiment – we test the sensitivity of our results 
to its exclusion. 
The outcomes that we observed are (i) time unemployed as measured by UI 
duration (and hence censored if entitlement exhausts) and (ii) exit state (job, training 
scheme, death etc) if the spell finishes. Knowing the exit state is in principle an 
important advance over knowing only the claim duration since treatment might 
encourage exit from the labour force rather than to work.
12
 We did not observe post-UI 
wages or other aspect of jobs, such as the duration of employment. Hence we cannot 
estimate the effect of treatment on quality of job matches. 
 What effects do we hypothesise treatment to have on the measurable outcomes? 
The small literature that has developed theoretical models of monitoring shows that the 
threat of sanctions increases search effort (Fredriksson and Holmlund 2006). We expect 
more frequent contact with the employment office to underline the link between 
receiving benefits and looking for work and to disrupt any activity in the hidden 
economy thus reducing its attraction relative to formal jobs. The questioning during 
visits again reinforces the benefit-search link and produces disutility for people who 
have to admit to little or no search activity, which should reduce the reservation wage. 
More visits to the employment office also raises the claimant’s exposure to a major 
source of vacancies. (Offices place about a third of claimants exiting the register to a 
job.) We therefore hypothesise that treatment results in a higher exit rate to jobs. 
However, we cannot rule out that treatment could stimulate search without any impact 
on job exits. Additional search may not be sufficient to generate offers, due to weak 
local labour demand or because it is merely token activity. Finally, exits to inactivity 
could also increase, where individuals decline to search but decide to cease claiming UI. 
 
2.3 Sample characteristics 
 
                                                 
12
 For example, Manning (2009) finds the tightening of job search requirements in the UK to have 
increased exits to inactivity but not to employment. 
11 
 
The sample of claimants was composed of 2,134 persons (1,115 treatment and 1,019 
control), split almost equally between men and women. Information on marital status, 
household composition and circumstances (e.g. number of children of different ages, 
employment status of the spouse) was obtained from all claimants at initial UI 
registration.  Table 1 shows the composition of treatment and control groups in terms of 
observed characteristics (other than outcome variables). No difference between the two 
groups is significant at the 5 percent level. The sample has a slight majority of 
claimants, but our monitoring showed assignment had been conducted correctly.
13
 
 
3. Results 
 
Table 2 shows exit states from UI for treatment and control groups, both for the full 
sample and for three sub-groups defined on age and gender. Two thirds of spells were 
censored, either due to the ending of the experiment or because the individual exhausted 
UI entitlement.
14
 There are only small differences between the distribution of the two 
groups across other states. Notably, for the full sample there is a difference of only one 
point between the percentages leaving the register to get a job (a difference that is not 
significant) and there is virtually no difference in the very low percentages voluntarily 
ceasing their claims to UI (who presumably exit to inactivity or to hidden economy 
jobs). This impression from the full sample of no impact from treatment is strengthened 
by Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival in the UI register (Figure 2). A small difference 
can be observed between treatment and control groups after 60 days, with the former 
leaving UI slightly more quickly, but a log rank test shows no significant differences 
between the two survival functions (Table 3). 
The picture changes when we disaggregate by gender and age. There are no 
significant differences for the men or for women aged under 30 in the distributions of 
exit states or in the survival functions. But among the women aged 30+, the percentages 
leaving to jobs (Table 2) and the survivor functions (Table 3) differ between treatment 
and control groups at the 6 percent and 8 percent levels respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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 Note that a year contains more odd than even numbered days of the month. We also tested for 
differences in characteristics between treatment and control groups within four sub-samples: women aged 
under 30, women 30 and over, men aged under 30, and men 30 and over. No significant differences were 
found other than for marital status among men aged 30 and over (71 percent married among the controls 
and 62 percent married in the treatment group).  
14
 This reflects the low outflow rate from unemployment in Hungary and other Central European 
countries (Boeri and Terrell 2002, Micklewright and Nagy 1999). 
12 
 
Nearly 30 percent of women of this age in the treatment group leave to jobs compared 
to 23 percent of those in the control group.
15
 The last three columns in Table 3 illustrate 
the difference in the survival functions – a quarter of the control group of women 30+ 
exit after 102 days but among the treatment group a quarter have gone by only 85 days.  
(An apparently perverse result is found among younger women, but the difference in 
survival functions is completely insignificant.) Figures 3 and 4 show the survivor 
function for the women aged 30+ and their (smoothed) hazard for exits to jobs, by far 
and away the most important exit state. A difference between the treatment and control 
groups emerges after about one month, at about the time when the experiment begins to 
bite, and then stays broadly constant, with the hazard for the treatment group about 40 
percent higher. These non-parametric results therefore show some evidence – albeit not 
strong – that treatment has an impact for women aged beyond their 20s. 
We now estimate flexible parametric models of the job exit hazard, including a 
dummy for membership of the treatment group. These models control for any 
(observed) differences in composition of treatment and control groups as UI spells 
lengthen. They allow comparison of the effect of treatment with the impacts of other 
characteristics. And they provide a convenient way for exploring whether treatment 
effects vary with characteristics beyond those explored in the graphical analysis, i.e. 
whether there are interactions – although the relatively small sample sizes and the high 
degree of censoring means it is difficult to estimate some interaction effects with any 
precision. 
We specify the hazard, h, of individual i registered in employment office e 
leaving unemployment at duration s and calendar time t, as: 
 
hiest = g(s).exp(αTi + βXi + γOe + δZt). 
 
where Ti is a dummy for membership of the treatment group, Xi are other observed 
individual characteristics (measured at the start of the spell), Oe  is a vector of 
employment office dummies that pick up fixed-effects associated with the strength of 
local labour demand or aspects of the employment offices themselves, such as skills of 
staff in matching the unemployed to vacancies, and Zt pick up real time effects. The Zt 
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 The sizes of treatment and control groups for women aged 30+ differ more than one would expect 
given the numbers of odd and even days each year and the total number of women of this age in the 
sample, but our monitoring showed assignment on the basis of birthday to have been correct. 
13 
 
are dummy variables for months of the year, allowing the hazard to change directly with 
calendar time as well as duration (claimants enter the register over a three month 
period). We model g(s), the base-line hazard, with an exponential function of a series of 
dummy variables for each two-week interval that turn on and off as the individual 
moves through a spell of unemployment (following Meyer 1990).
16
 The impact of 
treatment is assumed constant, unchanged with duration, s, or calendar time, t. This may 
seem inappropriate given the evidence of Figure 4. However, to estimate the model we 
condition on survival until the initial interview at the employment office. This is 
because up to that point, individuals in the treatment group are not administered any 
‘treatment’ – they are asked to return to the office sooner than the control group only at 
that interview. From that point onwards, there is a rough constant difference between 
the empirical hazards for treatment and control groups for women aged 30+, justifying 
our imposition of an unchanging impact of the treatment in the parametric modelling. 
Parameter estimates are reported in Table 4 in the form of hazard ratios. For 
dummy variables, these estimates show the ratio of the hazard with the dummy turned 
on to that when it is turned off. In the case of age (entered continuously), it shows the 
proportional change of the hazard with a change of one year of age. In the light of the 
Kaplan-Meier estimates, we interact the treatment dummy, Ti, with dummies for women 
aged under 30 and for women aged 30+. The coefficients of these interaction terms 
show the marginal additional effect of treatment beyond that for men. For reasons of 
space, we do not report the coefficients of the base-line duration dummies, the calendar 
month dummies, or the nearly 50 employment office dummies. 
The estimated impact of treatment for men and for younger women is 
insignificantly different from zero, as in the earlier non-parametric analysis. However, 
for women aged 30+, we estimate the hazard to be 50 percent greater for the treatment 
group, ceteris paribus (the product of coefficients on the treatment dummy and the 
interaction term). This difference is significant at the 5 percent level.
17
 As one would 
expect, estimating separate models for the three age/gender groups (not shown) 
produces very similar results – it is only for the women aged 30+ where treatment has 
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 We also estimated the equation in Table 4 with a Cox model, which avoids any need to specify the 
form of g(s) at the cost of using only information on spell-length ranks. The estimated effects of treatment 
were virtually identical. 
17
 In a model without employment office fixed effects the interaction term for the women aged 30+ gives 
an estimated hazard ratio of 1.49 with a t-statistic of 2.1. Treatment remains insignificant for other 
groups. Employment office fixed effects are significant at the 0.5 percent level (LR test with 47 degrees 
of freedom). 
14 
 
an apparent impact (hazard ratio = 1.60, t = 2.67). While this impact is significant at 
conventional levels, it is worth emphasising the width of the 95 percent confidence 
interval for the hazard – 1.13 to 2.26 – which is quite broad. 
Many of the other coefficients are insignificant. This is true of age (whether or 
not the age dummies for women are included and whether or not in logs), marital status, 
and spouse’s employment status. Children aged 0-6 have a significant negative impact 
on the hazard for women and a positive but imprecisely determined impact for men. The 
education dummies work surprisingly poorly – it is only the college/university educated 
where there is a clear increase in the hazard over the base group of primary/less than 
primary. 
Table 5 shows results of alternative specifications designed to check for 
variation of the treatment effect with individual and local characteristics, although the 
relatively small sample sizes hinder the precision of the estimates. In each case we show 
only the key parameters of interest, and results are given both for models estimated on 
the three sub-groups defined by age and gender and for the full sample. The top panel 
reports on interactions of the treatment group dummy with three dummies for marital 
status and spousal work status. For the women aged 30 and over, the results indicate 
that treatment has the most effect for those married with a working husband – ceteris 
paribus their hazard ratio is twice that for their counterparts who are in the control 
group. By contrast, treatment apparently has an insignificant impact for other married 
women and for single women of this age. However, some caution is needed since the 
hypothesis that the effect is the same for the three groups cannot be rejected at the 10 
percent level. For younger women, treatment again has no significant impact, regardless 
of marital status. We should also note that for married men with working wives, 
treatment is estimated to reduce the hazard, a difference that is significant at the 5 
percent level. This is difficult to rationalise, and serves as a warning of possible Type 1 
error when considering the estimates of positive effects for women aged 30+. 
We also investigated whether the treatment effect varied with the presence of 
young children aged 0 to 6, although as Table 1 shows children of this age are 
sufficiently infrequent to impede precise estimation of treatment interactions. (We 
tested without including the marital status and spouse working status interactions as 
well.) Treatment for women in their 20s has a positive effect that is just significant at 
the 5 percent level if (and only if) they have a young child, but no significant effect for 
the older women (where treatment itself remains significant for all women) or for men. 
15 
 
The bottom panel in Table 5 shows whether the effect of treatment varies with 
level of local unemployment. Where labour demand is lower (as measured by higher 
unemployment), treatment may increase search behaviour but have less impact on exits 
to work. Or offices may administer treatment less rigorously in areas where jobs are 
scarce. We investigate this by interacting the treatment dummy with the employment 
office area unemployment rate. The rate is measured at March 2003 and for simplicity is 
not allowed to vary with calendar time, t (aggregate unemployment changed little 
during the experiment). This means that we cannot include the employment office 
dummies as well – all the impact of the employment office fixed effects is being forced 
into the local unemployment rate. We show the results of models that include both the 
local unemployment rate and its interaction with the treatment group dummy. In the 
case of women aged over 30, there is some (rather weakly determined) evidence in 
favour of the hypothesis that treatment has less effect where unemployment is higher: 
the coefficient on the treatment dummy remains significant at the one percent level and 
the interaction with the unemployment rate is just significant at the 5 percent level (two 
tailed test). The estimated hazard for a woman in the treatment group in an area with a 
3½ percent unemployment rate is 2.02 times higher than that for a woman in the control 
group in the same area (or another with the same unemployment rate).
18
 This falls to 
1.46 at a 5½ percent unemployment rate and to 0.82 at 9 percent unemployment. (These 
rates are about the bottom decile, median and top decile values in the sample.) On the 
other hand, the unemployment rate itself is completely insignificant. 
Geography may also be associated with tougher existing administration of UI or 
with variation in the rigour with which the treatment was administered, as noted in 
Section 2. We estimated a model in which employment office effects were forced 
through a variable indicating the level of sanctions applied by each office, with this 
variable then interacted with the treatment dummy. However, we found no evidence that 
treatment had a larger effect in offices with a record of more frequently sanctioning 
claims. And the estimated impact of treatment hardly changes when we dropped the 
county where we had reservations about the conduct of the experiment. 
As further checks of robustness, we estimated models allowing the effect of 
treatment to vary with the duration of unemployment (by month), with age, by whether 
the individual had previously received UI, and by UI entitlement (through dropping 
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 Given that we report hazard ratios, this calculation is obtained as follows: 2.02 = 3.56*(0.85
3.5
). 
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individuals with less than 3 months entitlement). We also estimated the model allowing 
for unobserved heterogeneity following a gamma distribution. These specifications did 
not yield results that showed clear departures from the basic pattern in Table 4. 
However, in some models the inclusion of interactions rendered the main effects 
insignificant and this underlines the lack of a high degree of precision in our estimates 
of the treatment effect. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
The treatment effect appears appreciable for women aged 30+, especially for those 
married with a working husband, although we should recognise that the effect is not 
precisely determined. We can detect no significant positive effect for men and young 
women. We now address two questions. First, how does the finding of a gender 
difference compare with existing literature? Second, how should these results be 
interpreted? 
The finding that women react more to treatment is in line with the general 
picture from the literature on differences between the sexes in the effects of labour 
supply policies. Specifically in the case of job search monitoring, Martin and Grubb 
(2001) and Bergemann and van den Berg (2006) both conclude in their reviews of 
evidence that monitoring has a greater impact on the behaviour of women. At the same 
time, the evidence is not extensive. Not all analyses investigate gender differences.
19
 
Bergemann and van den Berg’s review for European countries covers only three studies, 
which in fact show a very mixed pattern of results. While our findings appear to support 
the existing view, that view seems based on scanty evidence. 
There are (at least) two alternative explanations for the experiment’s results 
(‘explanations’ in the sense of descriptions of the observed behaviour). First, search 
effort of men and younger women is already high and the marginal return to additional 
effort encouraged by the treatment is zero. Men and younger women in the control 
group make frequent visits to employment offices to access vacancies of their own 
volition, so their contact with the offices is no lower than for their counterparts in the 
treatment group. For the older women, treatment does bring more contact in practice 
                                                 
19
 For example, they are not reported in Ashenfelter et al. (2005) and Black et al. (2003). 
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with the offices’ vacancies compared to the control group, and there is a positive return 
to additional search stimulated by treatment in terms of job offers generated. 
Second, search effort of men and younger women is not high in the absence of 
treatment but the treatment does not produce additional search. The questions faced by 
the treatment group during visits to the employment office are answered with 
equanimity, with no disutility resulting. Treatment does mean in practice that additional 
visits are made to the employment offices but these visits do not result in better contact 
with vacancies. Only the women aged 30+ take advantage of the increased access to 
information on vacancies through the office visits. And only these women experience 
disutility from the additional visits and the questioning about job search, which increase 
the cost of leisure while unemployed, and react to a threat of sanctions if they do not 
increase their search activity. 
We do not have the detailed information on actual search activity of both the 
treatment group and the control group that would allow us to judge between competing 
explanations.
20
 The LFS data reported on in Section 2 show search behaviour of men in 
2002 to be greater than that of women but do not support the hypothesis that search 
levels among men were high – part of the first explanation above. This favours the 
second explanation. Interestingly, the LFS data also show women aged 30+ receiving 
UI to be less likely to be classified as unemployed on the ILO criteria than both men 
and younger women with UI, i.e. in greater need of ‘activation’. In leaning towards the 
second explanation, we cannot conclude which of the two elements of treatment – 
increased visits to the employment office and questioning during the visits – had the 
greater impact or indeed whether one had no impact at all. This is a result of the 
experiment having bundled together two different changes to UI administration. 
 On the face of it, the offices’ questioning about search during the experiment 
appears rather a ‘paper tiger’ since there were no clear sanctions to be applied if the 
individual blithely responded that no search had been undertaken. But, as noted earlier, 
claimants would have been unsure of this. This provided an incentive to search. If the 
women aged 30+ were more risk averse, the potential sanction would have had more 
effect. (The review by Croson and Gneezy (2009) concludes firmly that women display 
greater risk aversion.) The effects of a potential benefit sanction have been explored by 
                                                 
20
 In retrospect the experiment should have involved a more rigorous ‘process’ evaluation that attempted 
to uncover more about how the observed differences in outcomes came about. As well as quantitative data 
on search behaviour from the control group to compare with information on the treatment group, one 
would want more qualitative data from employment offices on the conduct of the experiment. 
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Boone et al (2009) in a laboratory experiment and they find evidence of behaviour 
consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979): asymmetry in 
preferences at a reference point (the current wage offer in their experiment) coupled 
with strong loss aversion – a sharp disutility from benefit sanctions. However, they do 
not explore gender differences.
21
 Another possibility suggested by this behavioural 
economics perspective, and one that does not rely on incentives, is that questioning 
about search set an ‘anchoring effect’ (see e.g. Camerer and Lowenstein 2004) in the 
claimant’s mind: that trying to find work is the expected behaviour for someone 
receiving unemployment benefit.
 22
 At the same time, it is unclear why this may have 
worked just for the older women (and note that all claimants in the experiment had 
worked in the previous four years otherwise they would not have received UI). Further 
experimental investigation in both the laboratory and the field is needed to provide more 
evidence on the impact of benefit sanctions in search models and how this impact varies 
between men and women.
23
 
 The issues dealt with in this paper are given further practical relevance in 
Hungary by changes to UI administration made since our experiment was conducted in 
2003. From 2005, UI claimants have been required to sign a contract when claiming 
benefit, agreeing to search for work and to report search activity when visiting 
employment offices. The claimant and the office also agree a personal ‘job search’ plan. 
Reflecting this emphasis, UI has been renamed ‘Job Seekers’ Benefit’ (as in the UK for 
example). However, monitoring of search behaviour does not seem to be at all strict in 
practice. Notwithstanding, LFS data record a rise in the percentage of UI recipients who 
are classified as unemployed according to the ILO criteria i.e. reporting search and 
availability for work. The figure for 2005 was 66 percent, compared to 55 percent in 
each year 2002-4. The rise was particularly notable for women (up 15 points), with the 
percentage in 2005 no different from the figure for men. It is of course impossible to 
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 Note that Boone et al’s experiment does not analyse job search effort – an offer arrives in each period 
and the individual’s decision is restricted to whether to accept. The authors report that they know of no 
other laboratory experiment of benefit sanctions. 
22
 Seen this way, questioning gave a ‘nudge’ towards a change in behavior. Thaler and Sunstein define a 
nudge ‘as any aspect of the choice ‘architecture’ that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way 
without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives’ (2008: 6). The 
literature’s discussion of anchors also suggests that questioning about search would have been more 
effective if individuals had also been asked about what they intended to do (rather than about just past 
search behaviour) and that if it had been underlined that their peers searched, i.e. that search is a social 
norm. 
23
 Further research may need to recognize that punishments (i.e. sanctions) can undermine ‘intrinsic’ 
motivation, the desire to carry out a task for its own sake. Bénabou and Tirole (2003) discuss the 
conditions when rewards and punishments have such undesired effects. 
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conclude that the apparent increase in search behaviour was a result of the policy 
change (or even that search, as opposed to the reporting of search, actually increased). 
But it does underline the live nature of policy surrounding benefit administration in 
Central Europe, including the issue of anchors or norms for search, and the possible 
differences between men and women in their behaviour. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Programme administration is a relatively neglected issue in the analysis of disincentive 
effects of unemployment benefit systems in OECD countries, especially outside the 
USA. We have investigated its impact with a field experiment with randomised 
assignment, conducted in Hungary. The treatment, involving more frequent visits to 
local employment offices and questions about job search activity, seems to have had an 
effect only for women aged 30 or over (an effect not determined with great precision). 
The experiment, and our investigation of institutional details of employment office 
practices in preparation for it, suggest that the Hungarian authorities were right to take 
issues of benefit administration more seriously – as they have done subsequently 
(although it is not the only aspect of unemployment benefit that is worthy of attention, 
with issues of coverage also prominent). 
  The finding of a greater impact for women has support in some other studies. But 
the evidence is scanty and we suggest that future research on the effects of benefit 
administration – whether in the laboratory or in the field – pays more attention to gender 
differences. Our own evidence for Hungary relates to a specific group of claimants in 
terms of employment histories who were all receiving UI in the early part of their 
unemployment spells. The administration of means-tested assistance benefit, which is 
typically received much later in a spell of unemployment, needs to be investigated 
further, something true in many other countries as well. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of the treatment and control groups of UI claimants 
 
Variable Treatment group Control group 
Female, % 51.8 50.9 
Age, average 32.7 32.6 
   Educational level, %   
Primary or less 30.4 30.7 
Vocational  34.7 35.6 
Vocational secondary 18.8 19.3 
General secondary  10.0 8.3 
College or university 6.1 6.1 
   Demographic variables, %   
Married 50.7 53.5 
Spouse employed 31.4 34.0 
Has children aged 0-3 8.0 7.0 
Has children aged 4-6 11.8 10.0 
Has children aged 7-10 16.4 15.6 
Has children aged 11-14 14.4 13.0 
   
Number of observations 1,113 1,019 
 
 
Note: no differences between treatment and control groups are significant at the 5% 
level. (Differences in educational level are investigated with a single chi-squared test 
with five d.f.) 
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Table 2. Exit states from UI register 
 
 
All claimants Men Women aged 
under 30 
Women aged 
30+ 
Exit state 
T 
% 
C 
% 
T 
% 
C 
% 
T 
% 
C 
% 
T 
% 
C 
% 
Re-employment 23.9 22.8 20.7 22.4 22.9 23.3 29.5 22.9 
Training  2.2 2.0 2.6 0.8 2.5 3.8 1.5 2.5 
Other active measure 1.8 2.2 1.3 1.8 2.5 2.9 2.1 2.2 
Disqualification 2.1 1.3 3.0 1.8 1.7 0.8 0.9 0.0 
Claim ceased voluntarily 1.0 0.7 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.4 
Other reason 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.7 
Censored – UI exhaustion 46.3 44.5 46.6 44.8 42.9 41.7 48.2 46.2 
Censored – experiment end 22.5 26.3 24.2 27.0 26.3 26.3 17.0 25.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
No. of observations 1,113 1,019 537 500 240 240 336 279 
 
Note: T and C denote treatment and control groups respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Log rank test of difference in survivor functions between treatment and 
control groups 
 
 
Sample 
size 
Log-rank test  Duration (days) at survival 
probability of 0.75 
  p-value Control Treatment  Difference 
Men aged less than 30 503 0.312 98 95 3 
Men aged 30 or older 534 0.578 105 105 0 
Women aged under 30 479 0.947 88 93 −5 
Women aged 30+ 615 0.076 102 85 17 
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Table 4. Model of the re-employment hazard 
 
  Hazard ratio t-statistic 
Treatment group 0.92 0.63 
Treatment * Woman aged less than 30 1.09 0.34 
Treatment * Woman aged 30 or older 1.61 2.41 
Woman aged less than 30 1.14 0.73 
Woman aged 30 or older 1.14 0.72 
Age 0.99 0.51 
Married man 1.22 0.94 
Married woman 0.97 0.12 
Spouse employed, man 0.83 0.81 
Spouse employed, woman 1.12 0.56 
No. of children aged 0-6, man 1.27 1.63 
No. of children aged 0-6, woman 0.69 2.50 
Vocational school 1.05 0.31 
Vocational secondary school 1.03 0.15 
General secondary school 1.11 0.70 
College, university 2.18 4.74 
   
No. of observations                 2,131 
 
 
Note: absolute values of t statistics are from the test that the hazard ratio is equal to 1.0. 
Coefficients for the base-line hazard (dummy variables for different time intervals), the 
employment office dummies, and month dummies for calendar time are not reported. 
Standard errors take account of clustering of individuals in local employment offices. 
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Table 5. Interactions of Treatment group dummy with other characteristics 
(hazard ratios) 
 
A) Marital status and employment status of the spouse 
 
  Women 
Men All 
  <30 yrs 30-49 yrs 
Treatment group*married & spouse works 0.82 2.10 0.48 1.09 
  (0.52) (2.72) (2.19) (0.58) 
Treatment group*married & spouse not working 0.20 1.27 1.13 1.03 
  (1.19) (0.53) (0.49) (0.13) 
Treatment group*single 1.05 1.09 1.07 1.13 
 (0.16) (0.33) (0.27) (0.72) 
Married and spouse works 1.16 0.87 1.37 1.11 
 (0.44) (0.72) (1.14) (0.74) 
Married and spouse not working 1.47 1.10 1.24 1.18 
 (0.61) (0.22) (0.82) (1.00) 
     
No. of observations 479 615 1,037 2,131 
 
 
B) Local unemployment rate 
 
  Women 
Men All 
  
<30 
years 
30-49 
years 
Treatment group*local unemployment rate (%) 1.13 0.85 1.04 0.98 
 (1.03) (1.97) (0.80) (0.44) 
Local unemployment rate (%) 0.94 1.03 1.06 1.03 
 (0.43) (0.71) (1.38) (0.74) 
Treatment group dummy 0.48 3.56 0.74 1.23 
 (1.08) (2.61) (0.77) (0.65) 
     
No. of observations 479 615 1,037 2,131 
 
 
Note: The models in panels A and B are as in Table 4 with the addition of the 
interactions shown and with the following exceptions. In the model in panel A the 
treatment group dummy itself is dropped but is interacted with the three groups as 
shown. In the model in panel B, the local office fixed effects are excluded. Absolute 
values of t statistics in parentheses are from the test that the hazard ratio is equal to 1.0. 
Standard errors take account of clustering of individuals in local employment offices. 
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Figure 1. Sanctions and disqualifications of unemployment benefit for behaviour 
during claim (yearly figures) per 1000 persons in claimant stock 
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Source: Figures for Hungary (dark bars) are for 28 of the 40 employment offices 
included in the experiment described in Section 3 and are averages for 2000, 2001 and 
the first six months of 2002. Figures for other countries (light bars) are from OECD 
(2000 Table 4.2). 
 
Note: Figures refer only to sanctions and disqualification applied during a period of 
unemployment to successful claims for benefit (loss of benefit due to voluntary quitting 
is not included). Hungarian figures refer to UI claimants only. 
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Figure 2. Survival in UI register, all men and women 
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Figure 3. Survival in UI register, women aged 30+ 
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Figure 4. Hazard to exit to employment, women aged 30+ 
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